Oxford Utilitarianism Scale

The scale consists of 9 items in two subscales. The first subscale–Impartial Beneficence (OUSIB)–consists of 5 items that all tap endorsement of the impartial maximization of the greater good, even at the cost of personal self-sacrifice. The second subscale was labeled Instrumental Harm (OUS-IH). This subscale consists of 4 items that all tap into a willingness to cause harm to bring about the greater good.

Items

  1. If the only way to save another person’s life during an emergency is to sacrifice one’s own leg, then one is morally required to make this sacrifice.
  2. It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to helping several other innocent people.
  3. From a moral point of view, we should feel obliged to give one of our kidneys to a person with kidney failure since we don’t need two kidneys to survive, but really only one to be healthy.
  4. If the only way to ensure the overall well-being and happiness of the people is through the use of political oppression for a short, limited period, then political oppression should be used.
  5. From a moral perspective, people should care about the well-being of all human beings on the planet equally; they should not favor the well-being of people who are especially close to them either physically or emotionally.
  6. It is permissible to torture an innocent person if this would be necessary to provide information to prevent a bomb going off that would kill hundreds of people.
  7. It is just as wrong to fail to help someone as it is to actively harm them yourself.
  8. Sometimes it is morally necessary for innocent people to die as collateral damage if more people are saved overall.
  9. It is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t really need if one can donate it to causes that provide effective help to those who will benefit a great deal.

Instructions

Indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 7 = strongly agree)

Response options

A 7-point Likert scale with at least 3 of the response options labeled: 1 = strongly disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 7 = strongly agree.

Scale items

item_nritemsubscalereverse
1If the only way to save another person’s life during an emergency is to sacrifice one’s own leg, then one is morally required to make this sacrifice.Impartial Beneficence0
2It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to helping several other innocent people.Instrumental Harm0
3From a moral point of view, we should feel obliged to give one of our kidneys to a person with kidney failure since we don’t need two kidneys to survive, but really only one to be healthy.Impartial Beneficence0
4If the only way to ensure the overall well-being and happiness of the people is through the use of political oppression for a short, limited period, then political oppression should be used.Instrumental Harm0
5From a moral perspective, people should care about the well-being of all human beings on the planet equally; they should not favor the well-being of people who are especially close to them either physically or emotionally.Impartial Beneficence0
6It is permissible to torture an innocent person if this would be necessary to provide information to prevent a bomb going off that would kill hundreds of people.Instrumental Harm0
7It is just as wrong to fail to help someone as it is to actively harm them yourself.Impartial Beneficence0
8Sometimes it is morally necessary for innocent people to die as collateral damage if more people are saved overall.Instrumental Harm0
9It is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t really need if one can donate it to causes that provide effective help to those who will benefit a great deal.Impartial Beneficence0

Reference

Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J. (2018). Beyond sacrificial harm: A two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology. Psychological Review, 125(2), 131–164. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000093